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The Signi cance of Business Interest
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Grif th University
ABSTRACT Taxation reform has dominated Australian politics over the past twenty- ve years.
Despite this prominence on the political agenda, until recently Australian governments have
lacked the capacity to consolidate key elements of this tax reform agenda. While the problematic
nature of Australian tax reform can be explained in part by macro-level variables, this protracted
policy deadlock has also in uenced historical patterns of business–government intermediation.
The article argues that the evolution of the Australian tax policy network over the study period
was prompted by both associational and state actors reassessing their strategies in the context of
the political failure of tax reform proposals. These developments provide empirical insights into
the ongoing debate relating to the factors which lead to the formation and evolution of sectoral
level policy networks. The article concludes that while the increasing levels of business mobiliza-
tion experienced over the study period enhanced the electoral viability of reform proposals, these
new patterns of sectoral business politics should be regarded as a consequence of the policy
deadlock relating to tax reform rather than primary cause of policy change.
1. Introduction
Taxation reform has dominated Australian politics since the early 1970s. The
most contentious element of the overall reform agenda has been the introduction
of a broad-based consumption tax (BBCT) to replace Australia’s antiquated
wholesale sales tax (WST) proposed to reduce Australia’s reliance on personal
income taxation.2 Despite numerous attempts spanning two decades, it was not
until 2000 that reforms of this type were successfully implemented by an
Australian government.3 The role of the corporate sector whose interests were
clearly involved in this extended process was the opposite of what we might
initially have expected. The tax reform process caused—and was not caused
by—the growing organization of business interest associations (BIAs) and
enhanced associational cooperation with the state.
This article has three broad objectives that relate to these developments in
Australian business politics. At the empirical level the study seeks to provide an
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overview of the changing nature of Australian BIA activity in relation to
domestic tax reform. A second objective is to assess the implications of the
Australian experience for the ongoing theoretical debate over the causes of
policy network change. Finally, the article will evaluate the signi cance of
increased business mobilization in terms of explaining the contours of Australian
tax reform.4 On this last question it is argued that while business mobilization
was an important resource in terms of enhancing the political viability of tax
changes, ultimately these new patterns of business politics were not so much a
cause of these reforms, as a strategic response on the part of associational and
state actors to a persistent, although slowly changing, policy problem. To this
extent the study supports the hypothesis presented by Atkinson and Coleman that
the institutional structure of the state is a key variable in terms of shaping
meso-level policy networks.5 The study also furthers our understanding of the
catalysts likely to prompt actors to modify their collective action strategies in a
given institutional context. In this case, BIAs mobilized and gradually developed
associational structures and patterns of interaction with the state that enhanced
rather than undermined attempts to enact contentious tax reforms.
2. The politics of taxation reform: an overview
The Australian experience with regard to tax reform has been protracted and
dif cult, described by Prime Minster John Howard in the lead up to the 1998
federal election as ‘the thirty year problem.’6 While in some respects Australia’s
tax troubles have been exceptional, restructuring national revenue systems has
proven nettlesome whenever it has been attempted. Indeed, any signi cant
economic reform has political implications, and one could argue that taxation
reforms are among the most politicized. As writers dating back to Schumpeter
and O’Connor have argued,7 the structure of a taxation regime affects not only
the levels of pro tability and investment of business and the  scal resources of
the state, but also directly in uences the economic welfare of an entire society.
More recent research on the political economy of  scal reform (PEFR) has
identi ed speci c collective action, distributional and investment problems that
plague this type of policy initiative.8 Many have argued that the ‘consolidation’
of signi cant tax reforms,9 especially those aimed at broadening the revenue
base through the elimination of existing exemptions, requires what Katzenstein
would describe as a ‘strong state’ that has the capacity to act despite societal
resistance.10
While the hypothesis that successful tax reform requires a signi cant degree
of state strength is both empirically and intuitively plausible, evaluating such a
hypothesis is complicated by the multitude of factors contributing to state
capacity. For example, Steinmo in a comparative study of taxation systems in the
United Kingdom, Sweden, and the United States, makes a compelling case that
the institutional structure of decisionmaking authority in each of these countries
affects state capacity and results in distinctive tax regimes.11 Steinmo argues that
limited state autonomy and the fragmentation of decisionmaking authority in the
United States, the case that most closely resembles the Australian policy
environment leads to a reactive and incremental style of tax policymaking that
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is not conducive to substantial tax reform. However, in seeking to explain the
relative success of  scal reform within a given polity the PEFR literature
generally argues that economic prosperity, the electoral popularity of the
incumbent government, executive unity and prevailing ideologies affect state
capacity within a given institutional context.12 A  nal determinant of state
capacity is the prevailing pattern of interaction between the state and key societal
actors in a given policy arena, with Atkinson and Coleman arguing that the
structure of policy networks will in uence the relative strength of the state in
speci c sectoral arenas.13
In seeking to explain the changing patterns of business politics relating to
Australian tax reform, this article will focus on the structure of the Australian tax
policy network as a political resource which actors could actively cultivate and
modify to enhance the political viability of tax reform. In other words, the failure
of Australian governments to consolidate tax reform proposals over the given
period provided BIAs with incentives to form more concentrated organizational
structures and create a more formalized policy network to facilitate the exchange
of political resources with the state.
3. Policy network structure and state capacity
Policy network analysis gained popularity in the late 1970s as an approach to
understanding meso-level patterns of interest group–state relations.14 Despite
numerous conceptual and methodological variants within the tradition, the
approach is centrally concerned with describing both the actors in the policy
process, and the relationships and interdependencies between them,15 providing
a theoretical foundation from which changing patterns of BIA organization and
interaction with the state can be analyzed. A consistent theme within the
literature is that network structures shape policy outcomes through in uencing
the relative political power of actors in the policy process.16 Building on
corporatist theory, Klinn argues that higher levels of concentration within a
policy network increase the political capacity of both societal and state actors
due to the potential for the mutually bene cial exchange of resources,17 while
Rhodes argues that mutual dependence created within network structures creates
incentives for strategic compromises between actors.18
Perhaps the most comprehensive analysis of the relationship between policy
network structure and state capacity is that of Atkinson and Coleman whose
work provides the baseline for the current study. Atkinson and Coleman not only
proposed a typology of sectoral policy networks but also identi ed structuring
factors that might lead to the formation of a particular type of policy network.19
Having established these conceptual foundations they assess the implications of
these various network con gurations for state capacity.20 Atkinson and Cole-
man’s main proposition is that the structure of sectoral policy networks is
in uenced by a combination of the state’s autonomy and concentration, on the
one hand, and the mobilization of business interests, on the other. State
autonomy is de ned in a manner consistent with the broader historical institu-
tionalist literature as the ability of the state to act independently of vested
interests.21 As outlined above, state autonomy is heavily in uenced by macro-
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TABLE 1. The conditioning factors for policy networks (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989, p. 54)
State structure
Mobilization
of business High autonomy, Low autonomy, High autonomy, Low autonomy,
interests high concentration high concentration low concentration low concentration
Low State directed Pressure pluralism Pressure pluralism Parentela pluralism
High Concertation Clientele pluralism Corporatism Industry dominant
pressure pluralism
institutional factors, leading Atkinson and Coleman to observe that ‘meso-level
phenomena cannot be explained in isolation from broader political phenom-
ena.’22 While related to state autonomy, ‘state concentration’ denotes the degree
to which decisionmaking authority is concentrated in the hands of a relatively
small number of of cials.23 Indeed, the Australian Treasury’s domination of
taxation policy during the 1970s and 1980s represents a good example of high
concentration within a weak state. In terms of associational organization, the
central characteristics of high mobilization are a clear division of labor between
BIAs to prevent overlaps or gaps in representation, member  rms’ and associa-
tions’ possession of information, technical and political resources and, perhaps
most importantly, associations’ capacity to bind member  rms to agreements
negotiated with the state.24
Given combinations of these various organizational attributes, Atkinson and
Coleman predict which types of policy networks are most likely to develop
(Table 1).
However, of greater signi cance to the research problem at hand is the
hypothesis, based on empirical research on Canadian industry policy, that
particular policy networks shape policymaking styles and the success of policy
reforms (Table 2). Within this schema, policymaking can be regarded as being
either reactive, in which the state lacks the capacity to consolidate strategic
policy reforms in face of societal opposition, or anticipatory, where the state is
able to achieve signi cant policy change.25 Clearly, for the reasons outlined
above, the consolidation of signi cant tax reform in the absence of a broad
consensus requires an anticipatory policy style and a considerable degree of state
strength. In this sense the structure of a sectoral policy network affects the
government’s ability to consolidate politically contentious policy proposals. As
Atkinson and Coleman warn, ‘where the political conditions for anticipatory
policy are not met, that is when policy networks are not based on concentration,
corporatism or state direction, and anticipatory policies are attempted anyway,
frustration will follow.’26
Atkinson and Coleman’s approach also provides insights into a more speci c
research question of direct relevance to the study at hand: given a protracted
policy problem, and the given fact that the institutional basis of state autonomy
is dif cult to change in the short term, how can stakeholders in a particular
policy arena reorganize themselves to support an anticipatory style of
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TABLE 2. Policy network type, policy approach and implications for state capacity (adapted from
Atkinson and Coleman, 1989, p. 63)
Policy network Policy approach Implications for state capacity
Concertation/state directed Anticipatory Enhanced capacity
Concertation/clientele pluralism Anticipatory Enhanced capacity
Concertation/corporatism Anticipatory Enhanced capacity
Pressure pluralism/parentela pluralism Reactive Diminished capacity
Pressure pluralism/clientele pluralism Reactive Diminished capacity
Pressure pluralism/parentela pluralism Reactive Diminished capacity
policymaking? Applying Atkinson and Coleman’s schema, actors would face an
incentive to move away from pluralistic modes of intermediation toward a more
formalized and concentrated policy network. An examination of Australian tax
policy—and, in particular, the extent to which the changing nature of the
Australian tax policy network was a strategic response to the Australian state’s
lack of capacity to consolidate politically contentious tax reforms—should help
us to assess the impact of state structure on associated organization.
4. Associational structure and the Australian state: a  rst approximation
The limited Australian research on the role of BIAs in the policy process has
largely con rmed the basic relationship between state structure, associational
organization and policy networks proposed by Atkinson and Coleman.27 Despite
identifying numerous sectoral nuances and cleavages, Bell concluded that
Australia’s institutionalized systems of protectionism and centralized industrial
relations had a signi cant impact on sectoral patterns of business–government
intermediation. Indeed, Bell went on to demonstrate clear relationships between
the mobilization of key BIAs and sectoral patterns of intermediation. 28 More
generally, the fragmented structure of Australian federalism seems to have
contributed to a similarly fragmented system of business representation largely
concerned with competitive lobbying in a pressure pluralist network.29 Beyond
this, the collective discipline within associations and the resources available to
them has also been limited by the underlying culture of liberalism ensuring that
members of representative associations are not especially committed to outcomes
which are inconsistent with their narrowly de ned individual interest. In an
assessment of BIAs that supports this conclusion, Mathews observed that ‘No
single association enjoy[s] a dominant and unchallenged position as the voice of
business or the voice of employers. No clearly established division of labor
pertain[s] between various national business groups. … Fragmentation and a lack
of organizational unity have always been the hallmarks of business and employer
representation in Australia.’30
While this limited evidence implies that in most policy arenas the Australian
state is institutionally fragmented, contributing to a lack of BIA mobilization and
ultimately to a pluralistic policy network and a reactive policymaking, caution
must be exercised when generalizing across industry sectors and policy arenas.31
313
Richard Eccleston
A recapitulation of Australian tax policy debate should provide a more nuanced
view of these relationships.
The changing nature of the Australian tax policy network: the 1970s
While there is some variation across sectors, speci c empirical research regard-
ing patterns of business mobilization on tax reform in the 1970s largely con rms
the pressure pluralist mold depicted above, with lobbying efforts re ecting the
speci c economic interests of a particular  rm or industrial sector rather than
broader notions of national interest.32 In contrast, the organization of state actors
was highly concentrated, with Treasury dominating both the formation of  scal
policy and the provision of advice to the executive. Indeed, this executive style
of decision making was almost closed to organized business interests.33 Yet up
until the 1970s this style of autonomous policy making and the absence of any
kind of policy network created little political fallout owing to the broad
consensus which existed in relation to postwar Australian  scal policy.34 In
short, a lack of contestation negated the need for state strength.
However, by the early 1970s the demands of the emerging tax reform debate
placed these established patterns of interaction between various BIAs and state
agencies under pressure. As early as 1973 the lack of coordination between BIAs
had become apparent, with even the best resourced groups, such as the Aus-
tralian Chamber of Manufacturing Associations (ACMA)35 and the Institute of
Company Directors, expressed private concerns at the quality of, and inconsis-
tencies between, each other’s submissions to the government’s 1975 Taxation
Review Committee.36 Beyond this lack of coordination, no business submission
to the Taxation Review Committee spoke to the central issues in corporate
taxation design, let alone to the broader set of issues which the committee had
to address under its terms of reference. Instead, the BIAs articulated narrow
demands for taxation concessions in much the same way many of them had
historically lobbied the Tariff Board.37
The combination of Treasury domination of the tax reform agenda,38 a lack of
business mobilization, and the state’s lack of autonomy created a pressure
pluralist policy network unsuited to the anticipatory policymaking style that
would be required to consolidate the tax reform agenda outlined in the  nal
report of the Taxation Review Committee.39 Despite widespread agreement on
the need for tax reform, the absence of a more structured policy network in
which stakeholders could negotiate and compromise contributed to the Fraser
government’s unwillingness to implement the recommendations of the Taxation
Review Committee. However, from the late 1970s peak BIAs such as the
ACMA subtly reassessed their tax reform priorities and strategies in the light of
the experience over the decade.40 Realizing that signi cant taxation reforms
would be not be implemented without more general popular support, the ACMA
began seeking to broaden the tax policy debate, formulating policy submissions
that addressed the medium-term economic interests of society as a whole, rather
than the parochial interests of speci c  rms or industrial sectors.41 For the  rst
time, BIAs were breaking the historically de ned patron–client relationship with
the state. Moving from self-interested advocacy to what Peters refers to as
314
Signi cance of Business Interest Associations
‘public interest politics.’42 In essence, this amounted to the realization of a
dependence relationship between business and the state in taxation reform:
business was dissatis ed with the status quo and demanded reform from the
Fraser government. Yet, owing to the politically contentious nature of the
agenda, the government was unwilling to move forward without the support of
a broader coalition inclusive of key BIAs. Ultimately this interdependence would
precipitate increased business mobilization and serve as the basis for the
evolution of new patterns of business–government intermediation during the
1980s and 1990s.43
The 1980s
Given the pluralistic nature of BIA–state relations in Australia, and general
popular resistance to extensive changes to taxation policy, the prospects for
comprehensive taxation reform appeared to be less than positive during the
1980s. However, changing structural conditions—such as an improving econ-
omy (with in ation brought under control after 1983) and more propitious
political circumstances (with the Australian Labor Party’s (ALP) electoral
popularity and commitment to economic reform)—bolstered state capacity such
that tax reform was once again on the national political agenda.
With the election of the Hawke government in 1983, the ALP leadership
began to recognize the virtues of consensus building in relation to the implemen-
tation of key economic reforms. This process commenced with the National
Economic Summit of 1983, which was convened to discuss issues related to a
National Prices and Incomes Accord, which had been the centerpiece of the
ALP’s economic policy agenda. While not directly related to taxation policy, the
National Economic Summit did highlight the limits of collective business
discipline and a lack of business mobilization. As Wanna has observed:
Alongside trade unions and community groups, the main business
associations were represented but some of their leaders were not
the most inspiring  gures … The business representatives were
poorly organized, multi-directional, and uncertain of the status of
any agreements arrived at by the assembled congregation.44
Yet business did learn from this experience and created a new and more
concentrated association structure in the form of the Business Council of
Australia (BCA) in late 1983 which led to an improvement in both the quality
and consistency of business advocacy.45
However, despite this progress and the optimism which followed the initial
success of ‘consensus politics’ at the National Economic Summit, the National
Taxation Summit of 1985 was to humble both the Hawke government and the
business community in what was a clear illustration of the limits of the
Australian state’s capacity to implement contentious policy reforms.
The Hawke government’s second term in of ce between 1984 and 1987 was
dominated by the politics of taxation reform, which veteran political commen-
tator Paul Kelly described as ‘one of the most intense public policy debates in
Australian history.’46 During the 1984 election campaign Hawke gave an
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undertaking to prepare a policy paper on taxation reform which in turn would be
discussed at a summit of interest groups in 1985 with a view to implementing
resulting policy changes later in the parliamentary term.47 However, despite this
rhetorical commitment to consultation, the preparation of the government’s
policy document, the Draft White Paper, like the recommendations of the
Taxation Review Committee a decade earlier, was dominated by Treasury and
largely overlooked business and popular input. In the words of a former minister
in the Hawke government, Graham Richardson, ‘Paul Keating (Treasurer) and
his Treasury colleagues had made up their minds about this long before the
review even started. For twenty years, Treasury had waited for the chance to
bring in a consumption tax, and now they had a powerful Treasurer whose
success record in cabinet was second to none’.48 Indeed, Treasury—the bureau
responsible for policy formation—was highly concentrated and committed to a
technocratic style of policy making unsuited to building the type of policy
network required to consolidate the reform proposal.
While the government’s proposed broadening of the direct and indirect tax
base mirrored the recommendations of the 1975 Taxation Review Committee
and the  scal orthodoxy of the time, it did not enjoy wide community support.
Business groups were particularly concerned about the government’s proposals
to introduce capital-gains and fringe-bene ts taxes and to tighten depreciation
provisions, while the unions and welfare and community groups were concerned
about the equity implications of introducing a BBCT.49 The government’s
prospects of negotiating a pre-summit compromise were dealt a  nal blow when
the presidents of  ve of the most signi cant national industry associations
released a statement ‘expressing disappointment with some key aspects of the
White Paper and considerable alarm at the potential cost impact of the govern-
ment’s proposals upon the business sector which would increase corporate tax
payments by up to 30 percent.’50 Beyond concerns of the impact of the proposed
capital gains and fringe bene t taxes, business was dissatis ed with the lack of
consultation in composing the Draft White Paper and the lack of choice in the
 nal document.51 It therefore came as little surprise when BCA president Bob
White failed to support the government on the  rst day of the summit.
Thus the BIA that had been willing to compromise and accommodate the
government’s agenda in pre-summit negotiations had been unable to support the
government’s preferred option, Approach C,52 as a consequence of an ‘internal
revolt’ of the Council’s membership in relation to the government’s fringe
bene ts tax proposals.53 While the BCA was an important new centralized
associational structure encompassing a range of sectoral interests, it had failed to
enhance the collective discipline of member  rms in negotiations with the state.
The prevailing ‘logic of membership’ among Australian  rms remained one of
policy advocacy focused on winning concessions from the state.54 Prime Minis-
ter Hawke pleaded with the BCA for a compromise and to ‘hold some capacity
for the broader view and some tempering of narrower short-term sectional
interests.’55 However, his plea fell on deaf ears: in a tactical shift that would
undermine the prospects of compromise with the government, the BCA joined
with the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI) to argue that reductions in
personal income tax rates should be funded by cutting public expenditure rather
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than imposing excessive burdens on the business sector.56 Such a proposal was
politically and ideologically unacceptable to the Labor government, which, in
turn, decided to broaden the income tax base without introducing a BBCT.57
Business had effectively been dealt out of the negotiations.
Business groups were quite cognizant of their ineffectiveness in negotiations
with the government. In a BCA post-mortem, consideration was given to
entering a quasi-corporatist agreement with the state in order to exert more
in uence over policy, although this agreement was subsequently dismissed on
the grounds that it would compromise the political autonomy of diverse business
interests. Instead, the BCA would ‘seek to simply offer the best practical advice
and urge good public policy on governments whose job it was alone to reconcile
competing views and back decisions on behalf of electors.’58 Despite the costs,
Australian business lacked suf cient mobilization to enter into a formalized
policy participation role with the state and would be left to interact with
government on a more ad hoc basis.59 However, within these limitations,
business groups did learn a great deal from the 1985 experience that would shape
their strategies and associational structures in the 1990s.
The 1990s
In the aftermath of the 1985 National Taxation Summit, the ALP abandoned any
ambitions of introducing a VAT to reduce Australia’s dependence on direct
income taxes. When combined with the ascendance of ‘dry’ interests within the
Coalition, and especially after John Hewson assumed the leadership of the
Liberal Party, there was new political support for the indirect tax reform agenda,
this time from the opposition benches.60 After the coalition’s ‘Fightback’
program was unveiled in 1991, there was considerable mobilization of actors on
both sides of the political divide.61 While peak BIAs who were supportive of the
Coalition’s tax reform and broader neoliberal policy agenda established a group
under the banner ‘Australians for tax reform’ to fund an extensive advertising
campaign to promote the ‘Fightback’ agenda, these developments were neutral-
ized by signi cant counter trends.
John Hewson ordained a level of political power unprecedented among
Australian opposition leaders when he was elected as leader of the Liberal Party
in 1990. After the divisive party leadership battles of the 1980s, Hewson enjoyed
almost unanimous support from within the ranks of his own party.62 As a result
of the rapidly deteriorating economy and the growing leadership tensions within
the ALP government, by November 1990 Hewson became the  rst coalition
leader since 1983 to enjoy a higher popularity rating than incumbent Prime
Minister Bob Hawke.63 This popularity in turn made the opposition leader’s
personal inclinations a major factor in the Australian tax policy debate. Hewson
made no attempts to build coalitions with the business lobby, openly antagoniz-
ing politically powerful industrial interests and criticizing the management of
some of Australia’s largest  rms.64 Hewson aspired to be Australia’s  rst true
political leader willing to do what was right rather than what was popular.65
In terms of Atkinson and Coleman’s typologies, he sought to engage in a form
of state-directed policymaking; yet this strategy overlooked both the institu-
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tional limits to state capacity in the Australian policy environment and the
importance of coalition building to sustaining political support for ambitious
reform proposals. Meanwhile, despite the fact that elements of business were
mobilized and committed to funding an unprecedented marketing campaign to
promote a BBCT among the populace, the ALP built an effective counter
coalition that included both disaffected business interests,66 and community
groups, and unexpectedly won the 1993 election after having trailed the
opposition in opinion polls for the two years preceding the election.67
By this point it was apparent that taxation had become so politicized that the
successful passage of reform proposals would require consensus not only among
key sectors of industry or even the broader business community, but from a
majority of the diverse interests that had been so vocal during the 1993 election
campaign. Moreover, it seemed that this consensus could only be achieved if a
more concentrated form of policy network was developed in which disparate
interests could effectively negotiate and compromise. By 1996 both business
groups and community organizations had come to the conclusion that reform of
Australia’s indirect tax was necessary.68 Like the Summit of 1985, the National
Taxation Summit of 1996 (although this time without state involvement) brought
together a range of stakeholders representing both societal and business interests
in order to ‘promote a strategic approach, with participants being encouraged to
think of the needs of the whole community and take a long term view.’69
By October 1997 this dialogue between BIAs and community groups was
complemented by the formation of the Business Coalition for Tax Reform
(BCTR), an association structure formed by forty-two member BIAs aimed
speci cally at promoting reform. Learning from the experience of 1993, the
group was determined to be nonpartisan and committed considerable resources
to commissioning independent research into tax reform options, a type of
research-based advocacy that would have been unheard of in the 1970s.70
Associational cohesion was further enhanced by the Coalition government’s
(elected in 1996) decision to defer detailed decisions on business tax reform until
after the 1998 federal election (in which the introduction of a 10% GST became
the main policy issue). While inherently dif cult to quantify, this organized
support from business of a GST (the BCTR strongly promoted the package as
in the longer term national interest)71 was a contributing factor both to the
government’s decision to promote the agenda in 1997 and its election victory in
1998. However, owing to the Australian tradition of state concentration in terms
of formulating  scal policy and combined with the commercially sensitive nature
of taxation policy, this role was con ned to a policy advocacy and promotion
role, rather than policy participation associated with more developed policy
networks.
5. The Ralph Review of business taxation
The one area of taxation policy where the Australian state has made preliminary
attempts to establish and maintain a more formal policy community involving
BIAs has been business taxation, especially in terms of tax administration.
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Business’s growing professionalism and mobilization on taxation policy was
re ected in the Howard government’s post-1998 election review of business tax,
the Ralph Review, which not only aspired to improve tax design but also sought
to restructure tax administration and the broader process through which business
tax reforms would be formulated, implemented and administered. Indeed, the
BCTR regarded a policy formulation process which was ‘phased with consul-
tation’ as essential to managing internal differences among business interests.72
The most tangible consequence of this new commitment to consultation and
consensus building was the creation of a joint business–government Taxation
Advisory Board ‘with a focus on the overall performance of the business tax
system and signi cant private sector representation to support the reformed
framework and processes.’73
This initiative to establish a more formal policy community, including an
institutionalized Taxation Advisory Board, was vindicated as 1999 unfolded and
the Ralph Review handed its detailed  ndings to government. A central reform
proposal was to further tighten depreciation concession on capital investments to
fund a reduction in corporate income tax rates. A skeptical  nancial media
believed that this would be the end of business consensus on corporate tax
reform because such a proposal would disadvantage capital-intensive industries
relative to other sectors.74 In an outcome indicative of the changes in business’s
approach to taxation reform over the previous twenty- ve years, the Business
Coalition for Tax Reform averted a major battle between capital-intensive
sectors (mining and manufacturing) and other business interests over the pro-
posal.75 For example, mining executives such as David Stewart, managing
director of Pasminco, were relatively receptive to the  ndings of the Ralph
Review when they were unveiled in September 1999: ‘for the mining industry
there are obviously some concerns but when you look at it in its totality there
are some very balanced outcomes.’76
It seems that by the late 1990s a greater level of business mobilization had
been achieved in Australian tax reform. New associational structures and
member strategies and greater levels of collective discipline all contributed to the
creation of what could be described as a mobilized advocacy network that
enhanced cooperation and compromise between corporate actors and ultimately
made a positive contribution to the political viability of contentious tax reforms.
The Howard government’s new GST regime started on 1 July 2000. While
business is still engaged with the ongoing corporate tax reform process, relations
have become more strained with the government on the issue of GST implemen-
tation. While business groups were almost unanimous in their support of the
GST legislation and associated reforms, they have been less content with the
manner in which the changes have been implemented. To date the most
signi cant issue has been the power granted to the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC) to limit corporate exploitation of GST-related
price rises, with the BCTR stating publicly, ‘The ACCC regime has already
begun to demonstrate its absurdity. It is costly for taxpayers, it is costly for
business. It infringes against basic standards of justice.’77 While both business
strategies and the taxation policy network did change signi cantly over the
observed period, it would be inappropriate to conclude that the prevailing culture
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of Australian business politics has been recast. While the political debate over
tax reform provided incentives for BIAs to mobilize, it could be that these
developments were issue speci c, and thus an anomaly in the prevailing pattern
of pressure pluralism. Only the passing of time and further research will tell.
6. Conclusion: cause or consequence?
This article has addressed three issues concerning the role of BIAs in Australian
tax reform over the past three decades. First, it has identi ed changing patterns
of BIA organization and activity over the study period. Second, it has tracked
how the business community’s interest in economic reform generally, and
taxation reform speci cally, led to the formation of interest associations such as
the BCA in 1983, Australians for Tax Reform in 1993 and the Business
Coalition for Tax Reform in 1997. Third, in terms of the level of policy
networks, it has considered a transformation in patterns of business–government
intermediation. Australian business interests evolved from the fragmentation and
parochialism of the 1970s to become relatively coordinated and sophisticated in
their policy research and political advocacy by the late 1990s. Meanwhile, in the
light of political defeats in the 1970s and the 1980s, the Australian state modi ed
its technocratic style of policy formation and was more mindful of business
concerns when formulating and assessing the political viability of tax reforms.
By 1998 these two processes culminated in businesses acquiring a formal, albeit
limited, policy participation role under the auspices of the Taxation Advisory
Board.
In terms of Atkinson and Coleman’s typologies, these developments amount
to a signi cant increase in business mobilization on tax reform and a more
modest reduction in state concentration, leading to what could be described as
a mobilized advocacy network capable of supporting an anticipatory policymak-
ing style. While this study seems to con rm Atkinson and Coleman’s central
thesis that increased business mobilization enhances state capacity, it also
suggests a need to elaborate upon and add to the original policy network
typologies outlined in their 1989 study (see Table 1). Clearly, by the late 1990s
the organization of Australian BIAs was not ‘hopelessly rudimentary’ as a
pressure pluralism network implies, yet neither state nor business interests were
able to dominate the tax reform debate as would be the case in a clientele
pluralism or a concentrated network.78 Thus, a mobilized advocacy network,
which arises when business groups are forced to mobilize and form ad hoc
associational structures to enhance the political viability of contentious reform
agendas, represents an important set to Atkinson and Coleman’s original schema.
While this study has argued that the structure of meso-level policy networks
is important for understanding state capacity, it does not undermine Atkinson
and Coleman’s central claim that macro-institutional and ideological variables
play a signi cant role in structuring policy networks. Certainly, traditional
pluralistic patterns of intermediation observed in relation to Australian tax policy
in the 1970s were very much a product of state structure and prevailing business
culture. Moreover, the changes to the Australian tax policy network observed
later in the study period were a meso-level response to a policy deadlock
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precipitated by state weakness (determined in part by macro-level institutions).
Finally, preliminary evidence points to the fact that, with the majority of the
Howard government’s reform agenda enacted, the collective business discipline
associated with the 1998 election campaign and its immediate aftermath is
starting to unravel. Having broken the political deadlock and achieved the
desired tax reform BIAs face diminished incentives to cooperate with the state.
As such, mobilized advocacy networks will tend to be transient and are likely to
dissipate once the policy problem has been solved.
Finally, what conclusions can be drawn regarding the independent impact of
the structure of prevailing policy networks on patterns of Australian tax policy?
While it is argued that business mobilization enhances state capacity, the
changing patterns of business politics documented in this study were not so
much the driving force behind the policy agenda as a strategic response to a
policy deadlock that in turn was precipitated by a broader set of politico-econ-
omic forces. That is, policy network change was a consequence of the state’s
inability to gain political support for tax reform and says much less about the
origins of the agenda.79 Thus, the evidence supports Atkinson and Coleman’s
central thesis that macro-institutional characteristics of a given policy environ-
ment are a signi cant determinant of meso-level policy networks.
Notes
1. An earlier version of this article won the 2000 Government—Business Relations Committee 38 of the
International Political Science Association competition for the best graduate student paper.
2. Head (1986).
3. This is despite the fact that base broadening measures were successfully implemented in many developed
economies during the 1980s and the fact that a tax reform agenda of this type was a central
recommendation of the 1975 Taxation Review Committee. This agenda included proposals to broaden both
the income and consumption tax bases with a view to funding lower marginal tax rates, remove economic
distortions and reduce the opportunities for tax evasion and avoidance. See Groenewgen (1982), pp. 26–27.
4. This article employs Atkinson and Coleman’s de nition of business mobilization as outlined below
(Atkinson and Coleman, 1989).
5. Atkinson and Coleman (1989).
6. The Australian, 9 December 1997, p. 2.
7. Schumpeter (1954 [1918]), O’Connor (1973).
8. For a summary of this literature, which is based on research of  scal reform in transitional Eastern Europe,
see Bonker (2000).
9. The ‘consolidation’ of a policy is used in the above-mentioned political economy of economic reform
literature to describe securing a political mandate for such reforms, enacting them into legislation and
surviving any political or economic fallout which may follow, the implementation of the reform.
10. Katzenstein (1977). See also Atkinson and Coleman (1989). Historically this has been the case with tax
policy with major tax reforms often coinciding with war or economic crisis, times when even weak states
can act in a ‘strong’ manner. See Levi (1988), Chap. 2.
11. Steinmo (1993).
12. See Bonker (2000), Martin (1989).
13. Atkinson and Coleman (1989), Atkinson and Coleman (1992), pp. 154–155.
14. For a summary of the evolution of the approach see Rhodes (1997), pp. 29–36.
15. Atkinson and Coleman (1992), pp. 154–155. It must also be noted that the literature has been plagued by
a de nitional dispute, particularly in relation to the central concepts of ‘policy network’ and ‘policy
community.’ The following article employs the concepts in the manner in which they have been de ned
by Coleman and Skogstad (1990), pp. 23–25, and Atkinson and Coleman (1992), p. 156. A policy
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community can be regarded as the actors and potential actors who have an interest in policy issues and
a ‘policy network’ describes patterns of interaction within the community.
16. While there has been widespread acceptance of the policy network approach as a means of classifying
different patterns of interest group—state intermediation, a persistent band of skeptics have questioned the
contribution of the theory to explaining political outcomes. See Blom Hansen (1997), p. 673, Dowding
(1995), p. 145.
17. Klijn (1996). ‘Concentration’ within a network refers to an entrenched hierarchy and strong collective
discipline within associational structures.
18. Rhodes (1997).
19. Atkinson and Coleman (1989).
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 52. Indeed, they cite Hall (1983).
22. Ibid., p. 67.
23. Ibid., p. 51.
24. Ibid., p. 53.
25. Ibid., p. 60.
26. Ibid., p. 66.
27. See Lofgren (2000).
28. Bell (1995), pp. 34–35.
29. Some of the institutionalized veto points which limit executive autonomy in the Australian policy process
include the structure of federalism and associated constitutional constraints; a powerful Senate which is
usually beyond executive control; a short 3-year federal electoral cycle and a competitive two-party
system.
30. Mathews (1992), pp. 197–198 in Bell and Wanna (1992). As quoted in Bell (1995), p. 36.
31. The two Australian policy arenas where there was signi cant BIA mobilization were those in which there
was a strong tradition of state intervention at a micro-economic level; centralized industrial arbitration and
tariff protection.
32. Bell and Wanna (1992), p. 108.
33. This is consistent with the research of Coleman and Skogstad (1990) in Canada, where they found that
executive-centered institutions created barriers to entry for organized interests (p. 314). For an account of
the dominant role of Treasury in Australia up until the mid-1970s see Weller and Cutt (1976) and Witwell
(1986).
34. Witwell (1986).
35. The ACMA later became the Confederation of Australian Industry (CAI).
36. This opinion was expressed in a con dential letter from the chairman of the ACMA’s taxation committee
chairman, Mr. A. M. Simpson to the Institute of Company Directors dated 4 September 1973. The National
Labour and Business Archives, Canberra, AT. 1506.
37. See, for example, the ACMA’s submission to the Taxation Review Committee, 14 August 1973. The
National Labour and Business Archives, Canberra, AT. 1506.
38. The Treasury agenda dominated the  nal report of the Taxation Review Committee published in 1975 with
analysts arguing that the Taxation Review Committee was lacking in economic expertise and ‘was too
closely bound to the apron strings of Treasury.’ See Thompson (1976), p. 82.
39. Taxation Review Committee: Full Report (1975).
40. For example, an early example of this more conciliatory approach to tax reform was expressed in the
ACMA 1977–1978 budget submission which advocated consideration of increasing the portion of revenue
raised from indirect taxation in a manner that was both analytical, objective and addressed longer term
issues.
41. For example, the 1977–1978 CAI federal budget submission advocated consideration of increasing the
portion of revenue raised from indirect taxation in a manner that was analytical, objective and mindful of
longer term economic imperatives. The National Labour and Business Archives, Canberra, Z187/AE-405.
42. Peters (1991). Peters suggests that, in a pluralist policy environment (such as the United States or
Australia), a transformation from self-interest to public interest is a prerequisite for tax reform.
43. As was outlined in the hypothesis above, both Klijn (1996), p. 98 and Coleman and Perl (1999) argue that
a dependence relationship between actors is a central factor in shaping more structured policy networks.
44. Wanna (1992) in Bell and Wanna (1992), p. 66.
45. The Business Council of Australia (BCA) was formed in September 1983 with a view to representing the
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interests of Australia’s 100 largest companies. It represented the  rst signi cant departure from state-
based, sectoral BIAs and demonstrates how business organizations do react to their policy environment.
The BCA was perhaps the most powerful BIA between 1983 and 1996, being eclipsed by the Australian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (ACCI). Wanna (1992) p. 74, Bell and Warhurst (1993).
46. Kelly (1992), p. 155.
47. Reform of the Australian Taxation System (Draft White Paper) (1985), p. 2. See also McCathie (1984),
pp. 1, 6.
48. Richardson (1994), p. 176.
49. The broad-based consumption tax outlined in the Draft White Paper was actually a 12.5% retail sales tax.
50. The associations were the Australian Chamber of Commerce, the Australian Mining Industry Council, the
Confederation of Australian Industry, the Business Council of Australia and the National Farmers
Federation. The Australian Financial Review, 20 June 1985.
51. The Australian Financial Review (20 June 1985). For a more considered analysis of the impact of the Draft
White Paper on capital, see Mathews (1985), Graetz (1985), Nevile (1985). On the whole this academic
analysis argues that the measures outlined in the Draft White Paper should have improved economic
ef ciency through reducing tax-related distortions to investment decisions, although Nevile (p. 52)
highlights the absence of quantitative analysis of this effect in the Draft White Paper. Mathews
(pp. 415–416) makes the point that business’s negative response to the Draft White Paper was primarily
motivated by self-interest: ‘It would have been prudent and in their own long term interests for business
leaders to have supported tax reforms directed towards improving the economic performance of Australian
business rather than to have concentrated on distributional issues including the preservation or extension
of existing concessions and privileges.’
52. Of the three policy options outlined in the 1985 Draft White Paper, ‘Approach C’ was the government’s
preferred option, which included direct tax reform and a 12.5% RST with few exemptions.
53. See R. Bowden, ‘ACTU to End the Accord if Option C Goes Ahead.’ The Australian, 2 July 1985, p. 1.
The BCA’s policy reversal demonstrated that the leadership of even the best resourced business
associations was constrained by the demands of member  rms or associations.
54. The term ‘logic of membership’ refers to the motivations which  rms and member associations have for
entering a group such as the BCA. See Coleman and Skogstad (1990), p. 23.
55. As quoted in Singleton (1990), p. 161.
56. Kelly (1985), p. 1.
57. Edwards (1996), pp. 276–277, Kelly (1992), p. 171. It must be noted that the government did offer a
concession to business in the aftermath of the Tax Summit in the form of an imputation system for
distributed company dividends to replace the existing classical company tax system. This cost the federal
government 4% of revenue over the following years. See Keating and Dixon (1989), p. 39.
58. McLaughlin (1991), p. 157.
59. For an account of the relationship between associational discipline and business’s ability to enter into more
formalized, quasi-corporatist relationships with the state see Dyson (1983), p. 56, Bell and Wanna (1992),
p. 110.
60. For an account of the transition experienced in Australia’s Coalition parties in the late 1980s, see Kelly
(1992).
61. Hewson and Fischer (1991).
62. Kelly (1992), p. 598.
63. Abjorensen (1993), p. 158.
64. The Age, 11 August 1992.
65. Since working for the Fraser government in the 1970s, Hewson ‘believed that Australia was in an
economic crisis and that national governments had been too weak for too long. Hewson declared that he
was not a career politician; he had come to get a job done’ Kelly (1992), p. 604.
66. Tingle (1994), p. 166.
67. Bean (1994).
68. As had been the case in the 1970s and 1980s, in ation had been pushing salary earners on average incomes
into high marginal tax brackets. Moreover, since 1993 the government had been forced to increase tax rates
dramatically on Australia’s limited WST (Wholesale Sales Tax) base. Given this evidence, welfare groups
such as the Australian Council of Social Services (ACOSS) recognized that in order to ensure adequate
levels of public revenue into the twenty- rst century, the indirect tax base would have to be expanded in
a fair and equitable way. See West eld (1999) in Kelly (1992), pp. 70–71.
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69. See the of cial Web site of the National Taxation Summit (1996): http://www. impactservices.com.au
/acci/index. htm
70. See the Business Coalition for Tax Reform’s Web site: www.bctr.org/who we are.htm
71. BCTR media release, 16 February 1998, http://www.bctr.org; West eld (1999).
72. ‘A platform for reform’ (1998), BCTR submission to the Review of Business Tax (Ralph Review),
http://www.bctr.org/default.asp?pnewsid 5 1106
73. Review of Business Taxation (1998), p. xxviii.
74. See ‘Push to End Industry Tax Breaks,’ Australian Financial Review, 24 November 1998.
75. Sectors which were opposed to the proposed reforms included the housing, tourism and automotive
industries. See ‘Business Groups at Odds Over Scope of Tax,’ Australian Financial Review, 20 May 1999.
76. As reported in Australian Financial Review, 22 September 1999, p. 16.
77. Warburton (2000), http://www.bctr.org/default.asp?pnewsid 5 1106
78. Atkinson and Coleman (1989), p. 55. It must also be noted that these typologies were always intended to
represent ideal types.
79. Although it must be noted that over a longer time frame, or in times of dramatic restructuring, the
relationship between sectoral policy networks, policy frameworks and their broader institutional contest
must be regarded as a complex causal system necessitating a historical-inductive research methodology.
See Atkinson and Coleman (1992), p. 167. Describing the system of causation as a complex dualism is
based on Gidden’s theory of structuration. See Cerney (1990), pp. 93–95.
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